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1 For evidence on “economic angst” in Britain around 1900 see, for example, McKenzie, American
Invaders; and Williams, Made in Germany. The commissions and delegations of the early twentieth
century were many. On the American side, for example, Massachusetts Governor William Douglas
appointed a commission in 1905 headed by Carroll D. Wright that was empowered to investigate how
industry in the Commonwealth was helped or hindered by existing educational institutions. See Massa-
chusetts, Report of the Commission. On the British side a private commission financed by the South
African diamond mine owner Alfred Mosely that included, among others, various secretaries of the
British trade unions came to the United States in 1902 to investigate labor, education, and training
issues. The commission was so well received that ex-President Cleveland met with the group, as did
Harvard’s President Eliot and U.S. Senator Mark Hanna. See Mosely, Mosely Industrial Commission.
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The modern concept of the wealth of nations emerged by the early twentieth century.
Capital embodied in people—human capital—mattered. The United States led all
nations in mass postelementary education during the “human-capital century.” The
American  system  of  education  was  shaped  by  New  World  endowments  and
Republican ideology and was characterized by virtues including publicly funded
mass education that was open and forgiving, academic yet practical, secular, gender
neutral, and funded and controlled by small districts. The American educational
template was a remarkable success, but recent educational concerns and policy have
redefined some of its “virtues” as “vices.”
A
t the dawn of the twentieth century the industrial giants watched each
other cautiously. The British sent high-ranking commissions to the
United States and the United States sent similar groups to Britain and Ger-
many. All were looking over their shoulders to see what made for economic
greatness and what would ensure supremacy in the future. The two leading
economic nations had grown closer in per capita income since 1850 and
were fierce competitors in product markets. It was a moment of angst for
Britain and one of enormous possibility for the followers.
1
The great industrial nations had scrutinized each other before and had in
prior decades sent commissions to uncover the source of economic great-264 Goldin
2 Previous delegations visited technology shows, such as the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition in
London and its U.S. counterpart in 1853, attended by the British team of George Wallis and engineer-
manufacturer Joseph Whitworth. Alexis De Tocqueville, Harriet Martineau, and others with interests
in the New World experiment in democracy were celebrated visitors earlier. See Sawyer, “Social
Basis,” on the British delegations to the United States after 1853; and Curti, “America at the World
Fairs,” for a discussion of the return visits. Curti’s treatment reveals the shift in the late nineteenth
century from technology demonstrations to displays that included America’s role in education and
training.
3 The Report of the Massachusetts Commission on Industrial Education noted in 1907, “We know
that the only assets of Massachusetts are its climate and its skilled labor.” Cited in Roman, Industrial
and Commercial Schools.
4 Secondary schooling in the United States means grades nine through twelve, independent of
whether the school is a junior or senior high school, and students between fourteen to about eighteen
years. In parts of Europe these grades are mainly in upper secondary schools, whereas lower secondary
schools often include grades five or six to eight. See also the Appendix.
5 OECD is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and today includes Austra-
lia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
ness. Earlier delegations focused on technology and physical capital. Those
of the turn-of-the-century turned their attention to something different. People
and training, not capital and technology, had become the new concerns.
2 For
the first time in history the postliteracy schooling of the masses—at the sec-
ondary and higher levels—was perceived to greatly enhance economic pro-
duction. Education might uplift, build moral fiber, enhance art, literature, and
culture, and produce public officials, as even the ancients knew. The novel
concern at the dawn of the twentieth century was that postliteracy training
could make the ordinary office worker, bookkeeper, stenographer, retail clerk,
machinist, mechanic, shop-floor worker, and farmer more productive, and that
it could make the difference between an economic leader and a laggard.
The modern concept of the wealth of nations had emerged by the early
twentieth century. It was that capital embodied in the people—human capi-
tal—mattered. The odd thing, however, is that even though most industrial
nations acknowledged the change, only one did much about it until well into
the twentieth century.
3
In 1900 no nation apart from the United States had more than a trivial
fraction of its youth enrolled in full-time upper secondary schooling.
4 The
industrial world had already recognized the importance of universal literacy,
but postelementary schooling for the masses was a new frontier. By the end
of the twentieth century, however, all but the very poorest countries of the
world had secondary-school enrollment rates that would have made the
masses of the rich nations in the early twentieth century green with envy.
And college and university enrollment rates among most current OECD
nations are now substantial.
5 Many have not just caught up to the levels
achieved in the United States, but have surpassed them. The twentieth cen-
tury was, indeed, the human-capital century.Human-Capital Century 265
6 By “gender neutral” I mean in terms of enrollment and graduation rates, not in terms of actual
treatment in the classroom or in courses taken.
For the twentieth century to become the human-capital century required
vast changes in educational institutions, a commitment by governments to
fund education, a readiness by taxpayers to pay for the education of other
people’s children, a belief by business and industry that formal schooling
mattered to them, and a willingness on the part of parents to send their chil-
dren to school (and by youths to go). The transition occurred first in the
United States and was accompanied by a set of “virtues” or principles, many
of which can be summarized by the word “egalitarianism.” The virtues
figure prominently in this essay.
By virtues I mean a set of characteristics that stemmed from basic demo-
cratic and egalitarian principles and that influenced the educational system.
They include public funding, openness, gender neutrality, local (and also
state) control, separation of church and state, and an academic curriculum.
6
These principles, in turn, gave rise to corollary virtues such as the use of
property taxes, competition among school districts, and permitting students
to repeat grades. The virtues were not always intentionally so nor were they
virtuous in all locations and situations, as in the case of local control and the
use of property taxes. Others lost their virtuous distinction over time, as in
the case of the almost infinite forgiveness of students. But for the moment,
and probably for at least the first half of the twentieth century, these were
virtues and were, as a group, unique to the United States and some other
New World nations.
The main questions addressed here are why the twentieth century was the
human-capital century, how and why America led in education, and what
impact this had on the U.S. economy. The virtues of the past need not be
those of the present, and I end by placing current U.S. educational policy in
historical perspective. Even though advances in higher education are an
important part of the human-capital century, this essay concerns mass sec-
ondary education because it came first and set the stage for the transition to
mass higher education.
SCHOOLING ADVANCES IN THE HUMAN-CAPITAL CENTURY
At the start of what would become the human-capital century, even the rich
nations of the world had but a small fraction of their youth enrolled in formal
secondary schools. These rich nations, however, had already converged in
terms of elementary-school enrollments, and even many of the poorer nations
of Europe had begun to greatly expand mass primary schooling.
But around 1910 the United States pulled ahead of all other nations in
terms of enrollment rates in postelementary education. The divergence was266 Goldin
7 See Easterlin, “Why Isn’t the Whole World”; and Lindert, “Comparative Political Economy.”
According to Lindert, Britain and France had elementary-school enrollment rates per 1,000 children
5- to 14-years old exceeding 800 in 1910. Sweden had universal elementary education but school began
late (at age 7) in the Nordic countries and thus their enrollment rates appear low.
8 Although there was some convergence to 1900 in educational levels among the industrial nations
of the world, there was probably divergence in educational levels among all nations in the world.
9 These data are from Mitchell, International Historical Statistics; see Goldin and Katz, “Why the
United States,” p. 11.
10 Industrial courses of study taught skills for a particular job. Often the school had a direct relation-
ship to a firm or labor union. Vocational courses (such as bookkeeping and typing) were more general.
11 On the evolution of the modern high school in America see Krug, Shaping. For a more critical
view of the changing secondary-school curriculum see Ravitch, Left Back.
also noticeable in what I will call the “templates” each of the nations formu-
lated for the training of youth. The United States, Britain, France, and Ger-
many, to mention the leading nations, took divergent educational paths. By
the end of the human-capital century, however, these paths have again con-
verged, to some degree. And even the poorest nations of the world have
flows  into  formal  education,  measured  by  enrollment  rates,  that  are
extremely high by historical standards.
Postelementary Education before World War II: Divergence
Mass elementary education, by the early twentieth century, had swept
through Britain, France, parts of current Germany, and Sweden, and was just
beginning to advance across other sections of Europe.
7 By 1910, using a
somewhat different measure, enrollment rates for 5- to 19- year olds were
fairly similar among the world’s economic leaders.
8 The ratio of this enroll-
ment rate in France to that in the United States was 0.93, that with respect
to Germany was 0.96, and even relative to Great Britain the ratio was 0.82.
9
Cross-country differences in the formal schooling of labor-market entrants
were, for the moment, quite small. The important point is that these differ-
ences would soon become quite large. The sole reason concerns changes
within the United States.
At the turn of the twentieth century the American high school underwent
a series of fundamental changes. It became less classical, more practical,
although still primarily academic. It embraced the sciences, modern lan-
guages, and commercial subjects, but was not industrial nor was it primarily
vocational.
10 Although some of its graduates were college bound, it would
no longer be, for a substantial fraction of its graduates, a preparatory school
for universities and colleges. Its diploma was, more and more, a terminal
degree for youths whose first jobs would be in a host of white-collar posi-
tions and certain blue-collar ones as well.
11
Americans invented the publicly funded, academic secondary school for
the masses. The “high school movement” in America radically changed the
education of its youth and set the United States apart from other nations forHuman-Capital Century 267
12 As I have shown elsewhere, about 70 percent of the increase, from 1930 to 1970, in the educational
attainment of U.S. males 40- to 44-years old was due solely to the increase in secondary-school atten-
dance (Goldin, “America’s Graduation”).
13 The statements just made, and substantiated later in this essay, will appear at variance with
Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown,” table A-12. Maddison, whose data come from a 1975 OECD
publication, claims that in 1950, for example, the U.K. population 15- to 64-years old had 3.27 years
of secondary school, on average, the German population had 4.37 years, and the United States popula-
tion had 3.4. These numbers are graphed in Nelson and Wright, “Rise and Fall,” figure 6, as “average
years of secondary education.” But these data are not comparable across countries. They do not refer
to a fixed type of school nor fixed age of pupils. They assume, for example, that “secondary school”
began after grade four in Germany but after grade six in the United Kingdom and also implicitly assume
that everyone in the United Kingdom in 1950 completed eight years of school and that all schooling
beyond grade six was in a secondary school or a college. In fact, when schooling by age of student is
computed, that in the United Kingdom was vastly below that in the United States for almost all of the
twentieth century. The U.S. advantage in education extended for decades. See also Dewhurst, et al.,
Europe’s Needs; and the data in Figures 1A and 1B in this article. The OECD now publishes data that
are more comparable by country.
14 “South” is defined as the three census divisions—South Atlantic, East South Central, and West
South Central.
15 See Stanley, “Higher Education,” on the GI Bill. Both the World War II and the Korean War GI
Bills generally paid full tuition and a stipend for college or other training, including that given by
proprietary technical schools. The Kalamazoo Case in 1874 established the legitimate right of local
school districts to use common school funds for public secondary schools. The right of youth to receive
a public secondary-school education came with the “free tuition” laws passed in most states beginning
in the early twentieth century. These laws made the home school district financially responsible for
paying tuition to a neighboring district if the home district did not contain a secondary school. African-
American children in the South and those elsewhere who could not travel to neighboring districts were
denied these rights or could not take advantage of them.
much of the twentieth century.
12 Compared with Britain and France, for
example, the United States by the 1930s was three to four decades ahead in
postelementary education and educational gaps remained large at least to the
1950s. Furthermore, that for college and university enrollment widened
substantially.
13
As the United States entered World War II, the median American 18-year
old was a high school graduate, and outside the South more than 60 percent
had recently graduated from high school.
14 When Franklin Roosevelt signed
the GI Bill of Rights into law in 1944, the average GI was able to attend
college for he had already graduated from high school. Nothing more clearly
demonstrates the difference in schooling between the United States and
Britain than the simultaneous passage by the Labour Government of the
1944 Education Act. The American GI Bill paid tuition and a stipend for
attending college, while the British Education Act of 1944 did no more than
guarantee to all youth a publicly funded grammar or secondary-school edu-
cation. School districts in the United States ever since 1874 were able to use
public funds to support secondary schools, and secondary-school education
became a child’s right in state after state in the early twentieth century.
15
Formal schooling is only one type of training and most countries of
continental Europe took a path divergent from that of the United States for
much of the twentieth century, as the data in Figure 1A, for 18 countries in268 Goldin
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FIGURE 1A
FULL-TIME SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATES, EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES, C.1955.
AUT NLD LUX DEU BEL CHE FRA IRL GBR DNK NOR SWE
0
20
40
60
80
100
F
u
l
l
-
t
i
m
e
,
 
P
a
r
t
-
T
i
m
e
 
S
e
c
.
 
S
c
h
l
.
 
E
n
r
.
 
R
a
t
e
s
,
 
1
5
-
1
9
 
y
r
.
 
o
l
d
s
Full-time general
Full-time technical
Part-time technical United States
FIGURE 1B
FULL- AND PART-TIME SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATES, EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES, C.1955Human-Capital Century 269
16 The data are from Dewhurst et al., Europe’s Needs, and include all youths in schools above the
elementary school grades and below the college level between the ages of about 14.5- and 18.5-years
old. See the Appendix for more details.
17 Tracking took off in the United States in the 1920s but was generally of a more forgiving kind than
in Europe. For a history of tracking see Chapman, Schools as Sorters; for a severe criticism of the
system see Ravitch, Left Back.
FIGURE 1 — continued
Notes: The data refer to the number of youths in public and private upper and lower secondary schools
(of the types listed) ranging from those who turned 15-years old during the school year to those who
turned 19-years old during that year. Thus, the age group under consideration is approximately all 15-
to 18-year olds, plus one-half of 14- and 19-year olds. No youths in elementary schools or colleges and
universities are included even if they were in the included ages. The procedure ensures consistency but
implicitly favors countries, such as the Nordic nations, that have late starting ages and penalizes those,
such as France and the United States, that have earlier starting ages. The computation for the United
States assumes 100 percent enrollment for the 14-year olds and then adds all enrolled in ninth through
twelfth grades and divides by the age group given above. The five European nations that did not give
data on part-time vocational schools are excluded from part 1B. All data are for c.1955.
Abbreviations are: Italy (ITA), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Austria (AUT), Greece (GRC),
Netherlands (NLD), Luxemburg (LUX), Germany (DEU), Belgium (BEL), Switzerland (CHE), France
(FRA), Ireland (IRL), Iceland (ISL), Great Britain (GBR), Denmark (DNK), Norway (NOR), Finland
(FIN), and Sweden (SWE).
Sources: European nations: Dewhurst, et al., Europe’s Needs, tables 10-2 and A. The data for England
and Wales, France, Germany (including the Saar and West Berlin), and Sweden, have been checked
against the original administrative records and small errors have been corrected. United States: U.S.
Department of Education, 120 Years, tables 1 and 9.
the mid-1950s, show. All 18 countries had enrollment rates in regular sec-
ondary schools (for youths 15- to 19-years old) that were low by U.S. stan-
dards.
16 Some countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway,
had extensive full-time technical training programs. But even adding these
students to those in regular secondary schools produces figures that are far
below that achieved by the United States in the mid-1950s. Only when part-
time students in technical schools are included, as in Figure 1B for 12 coun-
tries, does the total come close to that for formal full-time secondary school-
ing in the United States. Part-time technical students attended school for
anywhere from a few hours to several days a week. In Germany and the
United Kingdom there were almost twice as many 15- to 19-year old stu-
dents in part-time technical schools as in full-time (general plus technical)
secondary schools. Rather than providing formal, general schooling to all,
much of Europe tracked youth into technical training programs that were
often work-study arrangements for older teenagers.
17
Postelementary School Education after World War II: Convergence
Even by the mid-1950s upper secondary-school enrollment rates remained
low throughout much of Europe, but convergence to the leader nation was
rapid later in the century. As the youth of Europe made the transition270 Goldin
18 Net enrollment of 18- to 21-year olds in public and private universities in 1996 was 21.7 percent
in the United States and was exceeded by Greece (29.3 percent), the Netherlands (24 percent), Spain
(26.3 percent), and the United Kingdom (22.2 percent) in Europe, Japan (25.6 percent) and Korea (25.6
percent) in Asia, and the New World countries of Australia (22.9 percent), Canada (23.1 percent), and
New Zealand (23.3 percent). Adding nonuniversity tertiary education (for example, community col-
leges) raises the U.S. figure to 34.6 percent, equal to or slightly exceeded by Belgium, Canada, France,
Greece, and Korea. Because these are by age, rates for countries with later ages of entry or continuing
education are understated. For 17- to 34-year olds, the United States at 10.2 percent is exceeded by
Finland, the Netherlands, and Spain for university education. See OECD, Education at a Glance 1998
(table C3.3).
19 The other country was the Netherlands. There are 29 OECD nations; the three nations without
these data are Iceland, Japan, and Mexico. See OECD, Education at a Glance 1998, table A1.2a.
20 See the Appendix for a definition of the gross enrollment rate and why it can exceed 100 percent
for certain countries.
21 Because income inequality of currently poor countries is generally greater than it was in the United
States in 1900, this measure probably overstates median incomes in currently poor countries relative
to the United States in 1900.
22 The GERs in the UNESCO data for the United States are almost identical to the official U.S.
enrollment rates since 1950 (see the enrollment data in, for example, Goldin, “America’s Graduation”).
Comparisons among countries, however, may be misleading for various reasons. See the Appendix.
23 The GERs, particularly at high levels, may not be reliable because they are sensitive to the age
groups used in the deflator.
through secondary school they were poised to enter college and by the late
1990s college and university enrollment rates were substantial in much of
continental Europe and parts of Asia.
18 Among cohorts turning 20-years old
around 1955 only two of the 26 reporting OECD countries, including the
United States, had a college completion rate exceeding 15 percent. But nine
nations did for cohorts turning 20 in 1985.
19
What about schooling levels among all countries at the close of the
human-capital century? Except for the very poorest nations of the world,
upper secondary-school enrollment rates, measured by the gross enrollment
rate (GER), for today’s currently poor nations are substantial using mid-
twentieth century high-income country standards.
20 The solid vertical line
in Figure 2 gives U.S. real per capita income in 1900 just before the “high
school movement” began and human capital investments between the United
States and other industrialized countries substantially diverged. I will use the
level of per capita income in the United States a century ago as a loose
definition of “currently poor.”
21
The “dots” with dates in Figure 2 give the U.S. GER and income level for
the year given.
22 Any country that is situated in the South-East quadrant
delineated by lines through a given dot had a 1990 income greater than the
United States in the given year but a 1990 GER that was lower. One can
think of this as the “bad” quadrant. There are almost no countries in this
quadrant until GERs are quite high (greater than 80 percent) or until the
reference point is the United States in 1960.
23 In 1990 almost all countries
with incomes greater than the United States in a particular year had GERs
that exceed that attained in the United States for that year.Human-Capital Century 271
24 There are 14 countries in this category and they are, in descending order of GER: Guyana, Mongo-
lia, Egypt, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Peru, Jamaica, Panama, Algeria, Ecuador, Congo,
Zimbabwe, and China. Some of these nations have not yet had sustained high enrollment rates and thus
the human-capital stock of their labor force is still quite low. But that answer does not hold for many
other nations and there are more complicated reasons for persistent poverty.
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FIGURE 2
GROSS ENROLLMENT RATES IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND GDP/CAPITA ACROSS
105 COUNTRIES, 1990
Notes: The markers refer to geographic groupings in the UNESCO data: 1 = Africa, 2 = Central and
North America and the Caribbean, 3 = Asia, including the non-African Middle East, 4 = Europe, 5 =
Oceania, and 6 = South America. For the meaning of gross (secondary) enrollment rates, see the
Appendix.
Sources: Gross secondary enrollment rates: United Nations Organization for Education, Science and
Culture (UNESCO). Website http://unescostat.unesco.org/en/stats/stats0.htm. GDP/capita: Penn World
Tables, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/, due to the efforts of Alan Heston and Robert Summers.
But there is more that can be said because there are also countries in the
North-West quadrant for each year, that is the “good” quadrant. These coun-
tries had 1990 incomes that were lower than the United States for the year
given but GERs that were higher. In fact, many of the currently poor nations
have gross enrollment rates at or above 0.3, the level achieved in the United
States around 1920. Some of the currently poor nations have enrollment rates
that exceed 0.5, the U.S. secondary-school enrollment rate in about 1930.
24
Many have secondary-school enrollment rates that exceed those attained by
most European nations in the mid-1950s.272 Goldin
25 Among all poor countries in the data set 60 percent had GERs below 0.3, 20 percent were between
0.3 and 0.5, and 20 percent exceeded 0.5. If only male youths are considered, 54 percent had GERs
below 0.3, 20 percent were between 0.3 and 0.5, and 26 percent exceeded 0.5.
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FIGURE 3
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN GROSS ENROLLMENT RATES IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS
AND GDP/CAPITA ACROSS 96 COUNTRIES, 1990
Notes: See Figure 2. The size of the marker indicates the fraction Muslim. Large markers are for
those countries (about 15 percent of the sample) with more than 85 percent Muslim among the
population. About 65 percent of the countries listed have less than 10 percent Muslim among their
populations.
Sources: See Figure 2.
The point is clear. Even today’s currently poor nations and their people
invest in secondary schooling to a far greater degree, in terms of enrollment
rates, than did the currently rich countries in the past.
25
The poorer the country, not surprisingly, the lower is the secondary-
school enrollment rate for all youth. Of more interest here is that the enroll-
ment rate for girls, in many nations, is far below the average rate for all. As
seen in Figure 3, when income per capita is below that achieved by the
United States in about 1900, gender distinctions in enrollment are large. But
when per capita income is above the 1900 U.S. level, gender distinctions all
but evaporate. The few exceptions to this rule are all predominantly Muslim
countries. Similarly, when the ratio of male to female enrollment rates is
graphed against the male enrollment rate (graph is not given), gender neu-Human-Capital Century 273
26 See Acemoglu and Zilbotti, “Productivity Differences,” for an intriguing reason why the spread
of modern technologies forces the less-developed parts of the world to educate their people when
technologies are not easily refitted for less-skilled, low-educated workers. 
27 The list of industries is from Noble, America by Design, p. 18. See also Nelson, Managers and
Workers; and Nye, Electrifying America, on technological changes in manufacturing generally. The
papers in Oleson and Voss, Organization of Knowledge, establish the fundamental changes in the
structure of knowledge.
trality in enrollment is apparent when the male enrollment rate exceeds
about 0.4. The same exceptions of predominantly Muslim countries appear
here as well. Gender neutrality is a virtue purchased at higher incomes, a
fact that holds in the educational histories of many of the currently rich
countries as well.
WHY THE TWENTIETH CENTURY?
Fundamental changes around the turn of the twentieth century made for-
mal, general, school-based learning of importance to the emerging economic
leader of the world. These changes accelerated over time so that even the
world’s poor countries today have secondary-school enrollment rates that
greatly exceed those of mid-twentieth-century industrialized Europe.
26
A host of demand-side factors arising from advances in science, changes
in the structure of knowledge, and the emergence of big business, bigger
government, and large-scale retailing increased the relative demand for
educated labor generally, raised the returns to education, and led to the
expansion of formal schooling for the masses.
A primary reason for the emergence of the human-capital century con-
cerns the appearance of a “new” economy in the early twentieth century, as
some referred to it. The changes that created the “new” economy were per-
vasive. Some emanated from basic findings as diverse as the germ theory of
disease and the development of high-grade steel. They led to an increased
specialization of academic disciplines and a greater use of science by indus-
try. Certain industries became infused with science, including petroleum
refining, wood distillation, sugar refining, rubber, canning, paper and pulp,
photography, fertilizers, and later steel, ceramics and glass, paints and var-
nishes, soap, and vegetable oils. The internal combustion engine, electrifica-
tion, and the use of small motors were also major contributors to the “new”
economy. These changes did more than increase the demand for a small
cadre of scientists and engineers. They changed the demand for skills among
the mass of workers.
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The rise of big business and the growth of large-scale retailing increased
the demand for secretaries, bookkeepers, typists, stenographers, and retail
sales clerks, positions that generally required a high school degree or some
years of secondary school. The growth of office machinery (such as the274 Goldin
28 See, for example, Goldin, Gender Gap; and Rotella, From Home to Office.
29 The 1905 Iowa school report quoted The Twentieth Century Farmer as stating: “it takes a better
trained mind to be a successful farmer or business man today than it did even ten years ago. . . . The
new conditions of life on the farm demand improvement in general education for the farm boy or girl”
(Iowa, Report 1905, p. 143). On the diffusion of hybrid corn, see Ryan and Gross, Acceptance and
Diffusion. On the role of education in agriculture more generally, see Schultz, Transforming Tradi-
tional Agriculture.
30 On  skill-biased  technological  change  over  the  long  run,  see  Goldin  and  Katz,  “Origins  of
Technology-Skill Complementarity.”
31 See, for example, the descriptions of positions c.1920 in electrical machinery, glass, medicinal
manufacturing, paint and varnish, and the printing trades in U.S. Department of Labor, Descriptions
of Occupations.
32 Thomas, National Cash Register Factory, p. 34.
comptometer, typewriter, dictating machine, Addressograph, and mimeo-
graph) around 1910 produced the first “information revolution” in the office
and further shifted out the demand for clerical workers.
28
Starting, perhaps, in the 1910s even farmers recognized that a formal
secondary-school education was of value to them in learning about new
crops, animal health, fertilizers, machinery, and accounting techniques that
were  essential  in  managing  the  modern  farm.  More  educated  farmers
adopted technological advances at a faster rate than did others, as the diffu-
sion of hybrid corn has demonstrated.
29
The technological changes just mentioned served, by and large, to in-
crease the relative demand for educated labor.
30 Beginning in the 1910s
firms, particularly in newer industries and those that had more scientific
content, such as those just mentioned, stated that they preferred to hire pro-
duction workers with various types of general skills.
They mentioned the ability to read and decipher manuals, knowledge of
algebra to solve simple formulas, the mastery of mechanical drawing to
read and create blueprints, and an understanding of the elements of chem-
istry and the fundamentals of electricity. Blue-collar positions, for which
some years of high school or a diploma were required, demanded individu-
als with “good judgment,” who were “skilled in free-hand drawing,” with
“special ability to interpret drawings,” “[familiarity] with the chemical
formulas,” “general knowledge of chemicals used,” and “[ability] to mix
the chemicals.” Technical know-how and skills were also valued including
“knowledge of electricity,” “the properties of glass,” and “general knowl-
edge of photography.” Printing establishments stated that beginners should
be “well versed in grammar, spelling, punctuation,” and that “an elemen-
tary knowledge of Latin and Greek is helpful.”
31 The head of the employ-
ment department of one technologically advanced and forward-looking
company stated, in 1903, that: “in the factory we like the boys to have a
high school education if possible.” Of those in the office, he noted that
“office boys must give good references, must have good character … [and]
should have high school education.”
32 That beginners in the office shouldHuman-Capital Century 275
33 The term “American” refers as well to Canada whose educational institutions generally mirrored
those of the United States and whose high school movement occurred just a decade or two later.
have a high school education is not surprising for the 1910s, certainly not
for the 1920s. What is surprising is that this statement was made at the
very start of the twentieth century.
The increased demand for young people with these enumerated skills,
given their initial small supply at the start of the twentieth century, produced
high wage differentials between occupations that required more education
and those that required less. Put slightly differently, the return to high school
(and college) education around the turn of the twentieth century was sub-
stantial. I later present evidence on how substantial the return to formal
schooling was and how it changed over the twentieth century.
The nation that led the world in mass education chose formal, general
schooling and not specific, apprenticeship or on-the-job training as the pre-
mier method of investing in human capital. Why did the United States take
this route, why have most nations eventually adopted it, and why did many
nations in Europe initially do otherwise?
America chose a type of postelementary schooling that was consistent
with the particular features of the New World and with an ideology em-
braced by the time of the early Republic. Flexible, general, and widely appli-
cable skills that were not tied to particular occupations and geographic
places had enormous option value. Skills had to survive transport across
firms, industries, occupations, and geography in the dynamic American
economy. These New World features together with republican ideology gave
rise to the virtues introduced earlier and produced a unique educational
system, termed here the “American template.”
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THE EDUCATIONAL TEMPLATES OF EUROPE AND AMERICA
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the United States pro-
vided only one of several templates for secondary and higher education. Ger-
many, Britain, and France provided the other main contenders, which were
characterized by severe tracking at an early age and by the preservation of
higher educational levels for an elite corps. There were differences, however.
The British emphasized classical training for those who were allowed to
go beyond the compulsory grades. The French system produced a small
group of civil servants and a cadre of those well trained in technical and
scientific fields. The German system contained a number of tracks, some for
manual work, others for commercial pursuits, and an elite course for stu-
dents who would attend universities. If the American system is characterized
as open, infinitely forgiving, lacking universal standards, and academic yet
practical, the European system was closed, unforgiving, with uniform stan-276 Goldin
34 Consider a two-period model in which all agents invest in general (formal schooling) or specific
(apprenticeship) training in period zero and then work in period one. Technology is given by fi initially
but has probability p of changing to fj by period one. The agent who invests in an apprenticeship for
the initial technology (ai) in period zero earns fi (ai)
0 in period zero and fi (ai)
1 in period one if technol-
ogy does not change, where fi (ai)
0 < fi (ai)
1. The agent who invests in formal schooling (s) earns  C in
period zero, where C = the direct cost of school, and fi (s)
1 = fi (ai)
1 in period one, if technology does not
change. The formally schooled person, however, would earn fj (s)
1 > fj (ai)
1 if technology did change.
The agent, therefore, should invest in formal schooling if p > [fi (ai)
0 + C] / [fj (s)
1   fi (s)
1]. That is,
invest in schooling if the probability of technical change exceeds the ratio of the costs to the benefits
of the training. General training is more valuable the higher the probability of technical change (or a
geographic move), the lower the cost of formal schooling, and the larger the gain from general educa-
tion conditional on the technical change.
35 Much has been written about the greater U.S. than European migration rates since the 1960s. See,
for example, Eichengreen, “Can the Maastricht Treaty,” who shows that mobility within the United
States was two to three times the rate within European nations from the 1960s to the early 1980s.
Hughes and McCormick, “Housing Markets,” using longitudinal data for the 1970s and 1980s, show
that the U.S. migration rate for manual workers was about four times the U.K. rate and job-related
migration for that group in the United States was more than ten times the U.K. rate.
36 The data in Baines, Migration (appendix 1) have been used to show that, of those who could be
matched from 1861 to 1870, about 8 percent of the population of England and Wales did not persist
dards, and academic for some and industrial for others. One was egalitarian;
one was elite.
Why did the United States pioneer a novel and distinctively American form
of secondary and higher education and break from the educational templates
of Europe? Why did Americans engage in investments in human capital that
Europeans viewed as wasteful of resources?
A partial answer can be found in a simple model of choice between general
training, such as formal schooling, and specific training, such as an appren-
ticeship or on-the-job training. Investment in general schooling is more costly
than is an apprenticeship, but it produces skills that are more flexible and
transferable across place, occupations, and industries. Thus formal education
is more highly valued when geographic mobility is anticipated to be higher,
when there is a greater likelihood of technical change at the occupational or
industrial level, and when the gain from flexibility is greater after a technical
shock or a geographic move. It is also more valuable when the costs of formal
schooling are lower, possibly because of public funding, and when the costs
of specific training are higher, possibly because family ties are weaker.
34
General schooling for the masses fit American circumstances more than it
did those of early-twentieth-century Europe. Extensive evidence exists on the
considerably greater geographic mobility of Americans than Europeans for the
post-1960s.
35 Comparable data for the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries are scarcer. But evidence on intercounty migration for the mid-
nineteenth century suggests that rates in the United States were six times as
great as those in England and Wales. Many insightful historians and demogra-
phers, in addition, have commented on the accepted wisdom that within the
United States, Americans were highly mobile but that Europeans were not,
within their nations.
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in the same county (personal communication from Joseph P. Ferrie). Ferrie, “New Sample,” on the
other hand, calculates that 47 percent of the population of the United States did not persist in the same
county from 1850 to 1860. Emigration from England and Wales does not in any way make up for this
large difference. Adding gross emigration increases migration rates to about 11 percent. Demographer
Everett Lee, “Turner Thesis,” emphasized that migration “was and is a major force in the development
of American civilization and in the shaping of American character” (p. 78) and noted that he and Henry
Shyrock made independent calculations showing that the high migration rates in the 1960s extend back
to at least 1850 (p. 79).
37 See, for example, Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, on the role of education in how
individuals respond to economic change. Galor and Moav, “Ability Bias,” formalize Schultz and show
the conditions under which the rate of technological change, and not skill bias, increases the relative
demand for skill.
38 Lebergott, Americans, commented that the “incessant mobility [of Americans] made it thoroughly
unwise for any employer to invest much in training his employees” (p. 372). Elbaum, “Why Apprentice-
ship,” argues that the growth of formal education in the United States led to the breakdown of appren-
ticeships. It may have, but formal education was more consistent with the greater geographic mobility
of a country with great land availability.
39 An economist trained in Germany noted in 1915: “It is often remarked in the United States that
the German skilled workman does well and thoroughly what he has been taught to do, but seems to be
rather slow in originating new designs for new circumstances.” See Roman, Industrial and Commercial
Schools, p. 30.
40 France, in 1848/49, was the first European nation to extend the franchise almost universally. Even
in 1890 Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden had electorates of less than 35 percent
of the male population above legal age. Ireland and Great Britain had about 60 percent, Switzerland
80 percent, France and Denmark 85 percent, and Germany more than 90 percent. By 1900 Italy, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom remained below 60 percent (Flora, et al., State, Econ-
omy, and Society, pp. 91). See Acemoglu and Robinson, “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?”
for an ingenious model of endogenous franchise; Engerman and Sokoloff, “Evolution,” for the timing
of franchise extension in the United States; and Lindert, “Comparative Political Economy,” on the role
of the franchise in the earlier transition to mass elementary-school education. For a less benign view
of the U.S. franchise and a later dating of universal franchise, see Keyssar, Right to Vote.
Formal, school-based education enabled American youths to change
occupations over their lifetimes, to garner skills different from those of their
parents, and to respond rapidly to technological change.
37 Apprenticeships
and highly specific training were more cost effective for individuals who
expected to spend their lives in the same place and in the same industry and
occupation, but were not as valuable for others and clearly not for their
employers.
38 Europeans may have been correct in their assessment that the
American educational system was wasteful of resources. But it was not
wasteful in the technologically dynamic, socially open, and geographically
mobile New World setting. It may have even enhanced this dynamism.
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The factors just summarized provide only part of the reason for the differ-
ent templates. Others include the extent of the franchise, the role of the central
government in educational funding, the relative strength of pre-existing guilds
and labor unions, and the level of wealth and income per capita.
On these fronts, as well, the United States differed from Europe. The
franchise in the United States was extended to virtually all (white) males
early in the nineteenth century, whereas almost all European countries
achieved universal male suffrage much later.
40 Educational taxing and fund-278 Goldin
41 Income per capita in Great Britain in 1929 was about equal to that in the states of the Midwest,
whereas that in Germany, France, and Sweden was approximately equal that in Kentucky, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, the higher-income states of the South. The enrollment rate in
secondary schools in the Midwest was about 60 percent in 1930; in the South Atlantic it was about 38
percent. Enrollment rates in full-time general and technical schools for 15- to 18-year olds in these
European nations nowhere exceeded 20 percent in 1930 and were probably less than 15 percent.
ing for K-12 education in the United States was almost always controlled at
the local level, whereas in most European countries central authorities made
most of the taxing and funding decisions, even though curriculum decisions
may have been locally made.
The United States had, by 1890, the highest income per capita and could
most afford mass secondary-school education. Differences in income per
capita alone, however, do not entirely explain differences in education be-
tween the American states and the nations of Europe. Many of the poorer
U.S. states had secondary-school enrollment and graduation rates in the
early twentieth century that far exceeded those of European nations with
approximately equal per capita incomes.
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THE VIRTUES OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
A host of changes beginning in the late nineteenth century increased the
value of certain types of skills and knowledge, and by the early twentieth
century the United States was endowing a large fraction of its youth with
skills in formal, school-based, academic settings, using an educational sys-
tem termed here the American template. With the gift of hindsight, we can
see that by the end of the twentieth century many aspects of the American
template have swept the world’s educational systems. But how did the
United States pioneer a new type of education and how did it diffuse across
the vast land?
The “High School Movement”
Clear across America in the early twentieth century, citizens at the local-
community level discussed and debated the necessity for a modern form of
secondary education. The new schools would train American youth for
“life” rather than for “college” and they would enable a child in Nebraska
to enter the same office job as a child in New York State. These discussions
were part of a widespread grass-roots movement sparked by individuals and
by local associations. That is not to say that this was a completely uncoordi-
nated movement. Communities were, to be certain, guided by state commis-
sions and by various Progressive leaders, and states paid attention to what
other states were doing. But it is essential to an understanding of what hap-
pened in the United States to recognize that there were tens of thousands ofHuman-Capital Century 279
42 The enrollment and graduation rate data have been constructed from administrative records of all
public and private secondary schools (including the preparatory divisions of universities). To construct
the rates the enrollment numbers are divided by all 14- to 17-year olds and the graduate numbers are
divided by all 17-year olds in the state. See Goldin, “America’s Graduation.”
43 Many in rural farm areas saw the local high school as their only hope to maintain the current popula-
tion and local youth. The 1911/12 Iowa School Report remarked that a high school will “stop the drift of
the population to the cities” (p. 12). Wallace’s Farmer similarly noted that: “farmers of the district have
been watching their boys and girls going to town schools and acquiring ideas that take them ultimately
away from the farm. The farmers declare that a school is needed where regular high school studies are
taught and other work closely allied with the farm and its problems” (21 March 1913, p. 519).
independent school districts in America—about 130,000 in the 1920s. Al-
though many were common school districts of the open country, that still
leaves thousands of town and city districts to compete with each other and
make separate decisions on the expansion of secondary schools.
Secondary-school enrollment increased rapidly in the United States after
1910. Much of the increase was due to the building of high schools where
none previously existed. Other margins shifted out as well. Existing schools
became larger, more schools were built in large cities, and the high school
curriculum  was  made  more  meaningful  to  youth  who  had  previously
dropped out to work.
The high school movement began in New England, but spread rapidly to
the rich agricultural areas in the central part of the country and to the west-
ern states. By 1928 states in the New England, West North Central, and
Pacific regions had enrollment rates of about 60 percent of the relevant age
group and high school graduation rates of around 40 percent. These rates in
1910 had been less than 30 percent for enrollment and between 10 and 15
percent for graduation.
42 (See Figure 4 for a map giving contemporaneous
graduation rates by state in 1928.) The laggards (less than 20 percent gradu-
ating), not surprisingly, included the entire South. But many of the industrial
states also lagged. Enrollment rates in New York State and New Jersey, for
example, were half those in Iowa and Nebraska in 1928. Part of the differ-
ence can be accounted for by the greater ability of youth to find employment
in the “old” industries of the northeast, such as textiles. Another part is due
to the greater fraction of foreign-born in the northeastern population.
In 1938 the leading regions had graduation rates around or exceeding 60
percent and enrollment rates greater than 80 percent, levels achieved by the
entire United States in the mid-1950s. The industrial Northeast and Midwest
closed much of the gap during the Great Depression when jobs for youths were
scarce. Others, such as states in the South, did not close the gap until the 1950s.
Parents in the early-twentieth-century United States clamored to have
their children go to high school. In a nation with an abundance of small
school districts, each competed with the next to maintain population, partic-
ularly among small towns and rural areas.
43 The existence of numerous280 Goldin
44 When more than 50 percent of the electorate want the public good, the centralized system should
agree to fund more than the decentralized system but because of hysteresis, this will not always be the
case. The issue is taken up later in this essay.
Public and Private
Graduation Rate, 1928
 38.8 to 55.6%
 31.6 to 38.7%
 18.4 to 31.5%
 11.8 to 18.3%
FIGURE 4
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES BY STATE, 1928
Notes: The public and private graduation rate is the number of graduates from all public and private
secondary schools divided by the number of 17-year olds in the state.
Source: Goldin, “America’s Graduation from High School.” 
small and medium-sized school districts in America may have served to
increase secondary-school education in the first half of the twentieth century
in comparison with the nationwide fiscal districts of much of Europe. When
less than 50 percent of the electorate desires a public good, a decentralized
system will agree to fund far more than a centralized system.
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Smaller districts are, on average, more homogeneous with respect to
income, ethnicity, religion, and cultural values than are states, for example,
and greater homogeneity of tastes produces more optimal public-goods
outcomes. Education at the secondary and higher level in the early twenti-
eth century was often viewed as providing “private,” not public, goods.
Unlike the elementary schools, which taught basic skills thought to be
essential to a democracy and needed to coordinate commercial activity,
high schools were often depicted as producing skills accruing entirely toHuman-Capital Century 281
45 See the discussion in Goldin and Katz, “Human Capital and Social Capital.” Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly, “Public Goods” demonstrate a negative relationship between “productive” public-goods
spending and ethnic fractionalization. The United States was considerably more ethnically and cultur-
ally diverse than were most European nations, thus smaller districts enabled more homogeneity. But
Europe had more subtle class and income distinctions that may have been reinforced by decision
making at the national level.
46 Goldin and Katz, “Education and Income,” table 4.
47 Accredited high schools in Iowa in 1903 had to offer various language courses, have a laboratory
facility, and at least two teachers, among other requirements set down to regulate whether the graduate
of a particular high school could enter the state university. By 1914 accredited high schools also had
to have an adequate library. Almost 70 percent of all Iowa high schools in 1914 listed a course in
bookkeeping.
48 Lleras-Muney, “Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws,” uses the 1960 U.S. population
census to estimate the impact of these laws on the educational attainment of individuals who were 14-
years old from 1915 to 1939. Compulsory attendance laws by themselves, she finds, were ineffective
in increasing years of schooling but combined with child labor laws they had a positive but small effect.
See also Acemoglu and Angrist, “Social Returns to Education.”
the individual. The key was getting the community to fund the schools as
an intergenerational loan. To accomplish that feat, the community had to
be cohesive.
45
But was a high school education different from spending more years at the
local elementary school? A unique individual-level database from the Iowa
State Census of 1915 allows the estimation of the impact of an additional
year in high school versus in an elementary school or a common school. A
year in a high school in the early twentieth century added more than 11
percent to the income of the individual, but a year beyond the usual grades
in a common school added just 3 percent and one in a graded elementary
school contributed 5 percent.
46 High schools, even with few students in
small Iowa towns, apparently mattered. But why did they?
High schools in the 1910s, even small ones, endowed youths with skills
and knowledge for the “new” economy. Algebra, geometry, and bookkeep-
ing were offered in most high schools in Iowa in 1914. Larger schools had
a more expanded curriculum that included various laboratory sciences and
a range of practical courses such as mechanical drawing.
47 High school
teachers had far better training than did those at the elementary-school level
and many had college degrees.
I reiterate that the high school movement occurred at the grass-roots level.
The federal government had virtually no involvement until much later in the
twentieth century, and state compulsory education and child labor laws
played only a minor role in the expansion of secondary-school education.
48
States provided financial incentives for the building of high schools and the
creation of larger districts through consolidation, and they set up various
standards for graduation. One important and much neglected factor at the
state level was the passage of “free tuition” laws, which made a local school
district responsible to pay tuition to a neighboring district if the home district
lacked a high school. But these state involvements were minor compared282 Goldin
49 On the properties of the sample, see Goldin and Katz, “Education and Income.”
50 See Goldin and Katz, “Education and Income,” figure 2.
TABLE 1
RETURNS TO EDUCATION BY TYPE OF SCHOOLING AND OCCUPATION, 1914:
MALES, BY AGE
Type of Occupation
Type of School,
in Years
Nonfarm
All Nonfarm Farm White-Collar Blue-Collar
Males, 18 to 65 years
Common school 0.0427 0.0400 0.0375 0.0275 0.0239
Grammar school 0.0533 0.0647 0.0232 0.0470 0.0585
High school 0.103 0.102 0.114 0.0609 0.0740
College 0.103 0.106 0.132 0.0783 0.0533
Males, 18 to 34 years
Common school 0.0483 0.0375 0.0637 0.0438 0.0229
Grammar school 0.0693 0.0671 0.0568 0.0679 0.0634
High school 0.120 0.114 0.132 0.0826 0.0908
College 0.146 0.143 0.166 0.131 0.0575
Notes: Income data in the 1915 Iowa State Census is for 1914. All coefficients are significant at
standard levels. The dependent variable is log (annual earnings). The coefficients come from ten
regressions that include covariates, such as a quartic in potential experience, race and ethnicity
dummies, and years in the United States for the foreign born. Blue-collar occupations include those in
craft, operative, service, and laborer occupations (codes 300 to 988 using the 1940 census occupational
classification). White-collar occupations include those in professional, semiprofessional, managerial
(excluding farming), clerical, and sales occupations (codes 1 to 45, and 100 to 299 using the 1940
census occupational classification).
Source: Sample of the 1915 Iowa State Census, see Goldin and Katz, “Education and Income,” tables
4, 5, and 6.
with the power of the central governments of Europe to control funding and
curriculum.
I have already alluded to why the high school movement spread in the
early twentieth century and to the role of the “new” economy. The Iowa
data, mentioned previously, yield the earliest estimates of the returns to
education for a large and diverse population.
49 The returns to a year of
secondary school and college in Iowa were substantial in 1914 (see Table
1) and were almost double the return for similar individuals in Iowa in
1960.
50 Furthermore, the returns were high even within various occupa-
tions. For males 18- to 34-years old employed in white-collar trades, a
year of high school increased earnings by 8 percent, and for those em-
ployed in blue-collar trades the return was 9 percent. Most important in
an agricultural state such as Iowa is that fact that the educational return
to farmers was as high as it was for others in the labor force. And as high
as these estimated returns are, they must have been higher still. The data
from the Iowa State Census can reveal the returns to education only
among those who remained in Iowa. Those who left Iowa in the years toHuman-Capital Century 283
51 The returns to a year of education, from a standard log annual earnings regression, for Iowa-born
males in 1940 was 0.088, but was 0.066 for Iowa-born males currently residing in Iowa. Mean years
of schooling for adult male workers born in Iowa was 10.9 years, but was 10.4 for those born in Iowa
and still residing there in 1940. Thus a substantial fraction of the returns to schooling came through
migration. Estimates use the IPUMS of the 1940 federal population census; see Goldin and Katz,
“Education and Income,” fn. 63.
52 On earnings differences by occupation, see Goldin and Katz, “Decreasing (and Then Increasing)
Inequality.”
53 Goldin and Katz, “Why the United States Led,” table 3; and Goldin, “America’s Graduation,”
table 3. The South provides an interesting test case of egalitarian institutions. Even for white youth, the
South was an educational laggard. It had lower income and wealth per capita and also wider distribu-
tions of both than the rest of the United States. But it also had a more restrictive franchise, extensive
private schools, and greater state and county funding of education. See, for example, Margo, Race.
54 In contrast, differences in enrollments between the United States and Canada can be more readily
explained by income differences. The ratio of secondary-school enrollment rates in Canada, excluding the
Maritimes and Quebec, to those in the United States was about 0.70 in c.1930 and the ratio of incomes
come were among the best educated and earned more because of their
migration.
51
Why Did the United States Take the Lead in the “Human-Capital Century”?
Secondary schooling was of enormous value to young people in Iowa, and
evidence from earnings differences by occupation suggests that it was also
of great value in other states.
52 Why, then, did it diffuse at different rates
throughout the United States? More important to the central questions of this
essay, why did it not diffuse throughout Europe until much later in the twen-
tieth century? The answer is that supply-side institutions in the United States
were better able to respond to the demand-side shift, and they were better
able to respond in certain parts of the United States than in others.
The states that led in the U.S. high school movement had higher taxable
wealth per capita, less mobile older populations imparting community cohe-
siveness, a lower fraction of their labor forces in manufacturing, a greater
fraction of youth in public colleges, lower fraction Catholic, and higher
wages in manufacturing. The educational leaders also had more automobile
registrations per capita. Although this variable does not give the distribution
of income or wealth, it is an indicator of the fraction of the population above
some cut-off level of income or wealth. In that way it is related to the frac-
tion of the population in some middle- to upper-income group. Thus, the
states that were better able to respond were richer, with a broader middle-
income group, cohesiveness of population, and youth not enticed to quit
school early. The results just mentioned hold, by and large, in levels for
1928 and in differences from 1910 to 1928.
53
Can the factors that explain which U.S. states led in secondary school also
help explain why European nations lagged? The answer is that only a small
part of the differential diffusion between the United States and Europe in
educational institutions can be explained by these factors.
54284 Goldin
was 0.73 in 1913 and 0.70 in 1950. Secondary school enrollment divided by the number of 14- to 17-year
olds was 0.37 in Ontario, 0.27 in Manitoba, 0.34 in Saskatchewan, 0.40 in Alberta, and 0.37 in British
Columbia; in the entire United States it was about 0.50 and was about 0.60 in the states outside the South.
55 There were, of course, many types of exclusions, some based on race and some based on income.
Cross-national differences were largely due to the factors that gave rise
to the different templates. Some, such a geographic mobility and technologi-
cal dynamism, were due to New World conditions such as greater land
availability. Others, such as the earlier and more extensive franchise and
fiscally independent local districts, may have arisen from ideological differ-
ences but may also have been rooted in different factor endowments and
greater equality of condition in nineteenth-century America.
But these are not simple differences. Take, for example, decentralized
versus centralized public-goods provision in the United States. If there were
universal adult franchise but just less than one-half of the population favored
expanding education, a centralized system would result in no expansion. A
decentralized system, however, could result in school expansions in about
half of all school districts, depending on the geographic concentration of the
population with respect to the school decision. Thus, the United States may
have led in educational advances in the early twentieth century because of
its highly decentralized system. Others nations, however, should have caught
up rapidly when the fraction favoring public education rose to more than
one-half. But they often did not for a variety of reasons, some having to do
with the persistence of “class” differences.
Impact of Expanding Secondary School Education
The story thus far is that the “new” economy that emerged around the early
twentieth century increased the demand for educated workers. The returns to
education rose and became substantial even by the standards of the late twen-
tieth century. The response in the United States was to create modern second-
ary schools that were general, practical, and flexible and enabled youths to
continue with college or exit for work. More important, such schools sprouted
across the country and diffused rapidly. In the short run they enabled youths,
almost without regard to social background, to attend and graduate high
school and to garner skills that were geographically mobile.
55 In the long run,
they enabled a large fraction of Americans to attend college.
But what impact did the American template have on the economy and
individual welfare? As more individuals gained greater years of education,
the structure of wages narrowed, wage ratios for higher-skilled relative to
lesser-skilled positions fell, and the returns to education decreased markedly.
These changes occurred in two critical moments in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. One was around the late 1910s to the early 1920s, and theHuman-Capital Century 285
56 On the various data sets and the evidence on changing inequality across the twentieth century, see
Goldin and Katz, “Decreasing (and Then Increasing) Inequality” and “Education and Income.”
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FIGURE 5
RETURNS TO A YEAR OF SCHOOLING FOR MEN, 18- TO 34-YEARS OLD AND
THE 90-10 LOG WAGE DIFFERENCE
Notes: The 90-10 log wage difference is from the 1940 to 1990 IPUMS and the 1990 and 1996 March
CPS, and uses weekly wages for full-time, full-year, nonagricultural male wage and salary workers, 19-
to 65-years old. Full-time, full-year workers are those working 35 hours or more per week and working
at least 40 weeks in the previous calendar year.
Source: Goldin and Katz, “Decreasing (and Then Increasing) Inequality,” table 4, figures 1 and 6.
other was during the 1940s. Both, therefore, occurred during periods of war.
Although some of the compression was reversed after the wars, most of the
narrowing remained. 
The evidence for these compressions comes from various data sources.
Some give the “between” variations in wages, such as those for various white-
collar and professional occupations relative to blue-collar ones, as well as
those for skilled manual relative to unskilled manual occupations. Others
reflect the “within” variation in wages and give the wage structure of manu-
facturing industries at various points in time. Data also exist, as I noted
before, on the returns to education at several points since 1914. These are
given in Figure 5.
56 All of the data sets, including that in Figure 5, show
declining inequality for the period before the 1950s and rapidly rising in-
equality after the mid-1970s. Of most importance here is that there was a
narrowing in the wage structure and a reduction in the premium to education286 Goldin
57 See Phelps Brown, Inequality of Pay.
58 Hoxby, “All School Finance Equalizations.”
in the immediate post–World War I period that was reinforced and sustained
into the 1950s.
The same is not true of Britain. The World War I compression in the
British wage structure was markedly reversed after the cessation of hostili-
ties.  In  the  immediate  post–World  War  II  period,  however,  when
secondary-school educational advances began in earnest, the compression
remained in place.
57
VIRTUES OF THE PAST, VICES OF THE PRESENT?
The U.S. system of education was characterized for much of the twenti-
eth century by a set of virtues that included publicly funded mass second-
ary education that was open and forgiving, academic yet practical, secular,
gender neutral, and funded by small, fiscally independent districts. These
virtues were reinforced at the higher-education level by its competing
private and public systems and layers of publicly supported institutions
that are part of the forgiving educational system. During the first half of
the twentieth century, and for some time after, the American template
succeeded far better than did the competing templates of Britain, France,
and Germany. The U.S. system produced a considerably larger group of
educated citizens and workers. It did not, by and large, reinforce “class”
distinctions, but rather, enabled social and geographic mobility and pro-
duced a large decrease in inequality in economic outcomes. It may also
have increased technological change and economic growth, but that is a
more difficult connection to establish.
But some of the characteristics that were deservedly deemed the virtues of
the past now appear to contain vices. For example, a forgiving system without
severe tracking at early ages may be egalitarian and nonelitist, but it is also
one without strict standards. It may be considered virtuous when enrollment
rates are low for young teenagers but it may spawn a system without standards
and will discourage effort when enrollment rates are higher.
The system of small, fiscally independent districts dependent on property
taxes and competing for residents may foster educational investments if there
are wide differences in tastes and when enrollments are low. But it may also
produce large differences in funding. Laws to equalize amounts spent per
school child have been passed in almost all states since the 1970s but have
had unintended and occasionally dire consequences.
58 States had historically
responded to income differences by providing grants to poorer districts for
schools and teacher salaries. But in more recent decades the response has been
to impose on districts marginal taxes that are high, even greater than one.Human-Capital Century 287
Rather than equalizing dollars per pupil holding mean expenditures constant,
some rules appear to have actually lowered the mean amount spent per pupil
and even that spent by districts at the lower end of the income distribution.
A general, academic education for most may enhance flexibility ex ante,
but may, ex post, leave behind many in the lower part of the educational
distribution. The United States, a century ago, looked to the German system
of apprenticeship training and rejected it. When rising inequality in the
1980s and 1990s led to concerns over the lower part of the distribution, the
German system was reconsidered and rejected again.
A secular educational system was crucial to maintaining fairness and
support for public funding in a religiously pluralistic nation. But more re-
cently the possible use of vouchers to create more competition for public
school districts has been stymied in poor neighborhoods by the absence of
all but parochial private schools. 
Each of the characteristics just mentioned—open, forgiving, small fiscally
independent districts relying on local property taxes, academic, secular—
was once a virtue. Most still are. But changing circumstances have made
some considerably less virtuous and others now appear to be vices.
Despite the cracks in the system, there is considerable persistence in the
virtues. The states that provided more education in the past continue to do
so even though their economic fortunes have changed. The high education
states in 1928 (see Figure 6) were also, by and large, those with better
educational performance records in 1993, measured by a wide-ranging
index. The correlation is 0.60; in the absence of three outliers (CA, ND,
and NV), the correlation is 0.77, a surprisingly high level of persistence
over 65 years. One large and important state is obvious among the out-
liers—California. Its younger and older populations now differ in their
demands for educational spending, and its per pupil expenditure, relative to
that of the rest of the nation, has plummeted as an unintended consequences
of state equalization.
The twentieth century was the human-capital century. America led other
nations by a wide margin in the provision of general, formal education to the
masses and did so because of characteristics—what I have called the vir-
tues—that were shaped by New World endowments and Republican ideol-
ogy. The characteristics remain, but all may no longer be virtues.
Appendix: Measuring Cross-Country Educational
Attainment and Enrollment Rates
There is no simple or easy way to make comparisons with regard to educational attain-
ment and school enrollment rates across countries. Children in Sweden and other Nordic
countries, for example, begin school at age seven; they do so today and have done so for288 Goldin
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PERSISTENCE OF EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES: 1928 AND C.1993
Notes: The educational performance index for c.1993 is an average of three components: (1) a combina-
tion of seven National Assessment of Educational Progress scores for 1990, 1992, and 1996; (2) the
average Scholastic Aptitude Test score in 1993, adjusted for participation-rate differences among states;
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Source: Goldin and Katz, “Human Capital and Social Capital.”
much of the past. Children in France, however, begin school at age five. If the measure of
schooling is the fraction in upper secondary school among those 15-to 19-years old, then
Sweden will have a higher enrollment rate than France even if they both have the same
fraction of youth who ever attended these schools. Some measures, therefore, try to take
into consideration the age group in the type of school considered (for example, UNESCO
data). But the number of countries that report the age of students is limited even today. It
is unwise and often highly misleading to use the type or name of school as a guide for
classification since “secondary school” once began for certain children at age 11 in Britain,
but has almost always begun at age 15 (with ninth grade) in the United States. (See
Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown,” for an example of the confusion that can result from
using type or name of school.) Further complications arise because some countries have
full-time technical training and some have part-time work-study arrangements. All of these
examples show the need for various measures of enrollment rates. Some will be useful in
comparing the total number of youths being educated or trained. Some will be useful to
show the fraction who are prepared to continue with college or university.
Fraction of 15- to 19-year olds enrolled full-time in secondary schools: gives the numberHuman-Capital Century 289
of students in full-time secondary schools who are between 15- and 19-years old, (that is,
individuals turning 15-years old during one of the included grades but not turning 20-years
old), divided by the number of youths in the population in these age ranges. In computing
the denominator one-half the number of 14-year olds and one-half the number of 19-year
olds was added to those 15- to 18-years old. No individuals in colleges and universities
were included, but those in full-time lower secondary schools were, if they met the condi-
tions just stated. The students were primarily those in upper secondary schools (high
schools in the United States that included ninth to twelfth grades) but also included some
in lower secondary schools (ninth graders in the United States in junior high schools). The
definition is due to Dewhurst, et al., Europe’s Needs and Resources, who produced the data
for 18 countries in 1955/56. The computations for c.1938 and c.1975 were done for consis-
tency with the procedure devised by Dewhurst et al.
Gross Enrollment Rate (GER): gives the fraction of individuals in an age group who are
currently enrolled in a particular level of school (for example, upper secondary). The age
group in the UNESCO data is supposed to be tailored to that included in the school level
for the particular nation. The GER can exceed 100 percent if some youth outside the usual
age group, for various reasons, are enrolled in that level of schooling. See UNESCO,
http://unescostat.unesco.org/en/stats/stats0.htm.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua Angrist. “How Large are the Social Returns to Education?
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws.” NBER Working Paper no. 7444, De-
cember 1999.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics CXV (November 2000): 1167–99.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Fabrizio Zilbotti. “ Productivity Differences.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics CXVI (May 2001): forthcoming.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (November 1999): 1243–84.
Baines, Dudley. Migration in a Mature Economy: Emigration and Internal Migration in
England and Wales, 1861–1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Chapman, Paul David. Schools as Sorters: Lewis Terman, Applied Psychology, and the Intelli-
gence Testing Movement, 1890–1930. New York: New York University Press, 1988.
Curti, Merle. “America at the World Fairs, 1851–1893.” American Historical Review 55
(July 1950): 833–56.
Dewhurst, J. Frederic, John O. Coppock, P. Lamartine Yates, and Associates. Europe’s
Needs and Resources: Trends and Prospects in Eighteen Countries. New York: Twen-
tieth Century Fund, 1961.
Easterlin, Richard. “Why Isn’t the Whole World Developed?” This JOURNAL 51 (March
1981): 1–19.
Eichengreen, Barry. “Can the Maastricht Treaty Be Saved?” Princeton Studies in Interna-
tional Finance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, International Economics Section,
December 1992.
Elbaum, Bernard. “Why Apprenticeship Persisted in Britain but Not in the United States.”
This JOURNAL 49 (June 1989): 337–49.
Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. “The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions290 Goldin
in the New World: A Preliminary Look.” Unpublished manuscript, UCLA, June 2000.
Ferrie, Joseph P. “A New Sample of Males Linked from the Public Use Micro Sample of
the 1850 U.S. Federal Population Census to the 1860 U.S. Federal Census Manuscript
Schedules.” Historical Methods 29 (Fall 1996): 141–56.
Flora, Peter, Jens Alber, Richard Eichenberg, et al. State, Economy, and Society in Western
Europe, 1815–1975. Vol. I. The Growth of Mass Democracies and Welfare States.
Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1983.
Galor, Oded, and Omer Moav. “Ability-Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequality,
and Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (May 2000): 469–97.
Goldin, Claudia. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American
Women. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
______. “America’s Graduation from High School: The Evolution and Spread of Second-
ary Schooling in the Twentieth Century.” This JOURNAL 58 (June 1998): 345–74.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. “The Origins of Technology-Skill Complemen-
tarity.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (June 1998): 693–732.
______. “The Shaping of Higher Education: The Formative Years in the United States,
1890 to 1940.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (Winter 1999): 37–62.
______. “Human Capital and Social Capital: The Rise of Secondary Schooling in America,
1910 to 1940.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History XXIX (Spring 1999): 683–723.
______. “Education and Income in the Early Twentieth Century: Evidence from the Prai-
ries.” This JOURNAL 60 (September 2000): 782–818.
______. “Decreasing (and Then Increasing) Inequality in America: A Tale of Two Half
Centuries.” In The Causes and Consequences of Increasing Income Inequality, edited
by F. Welch, pp. 37–82. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Hansen, Hal Eugene. “Caps and Gowns: Historical Reflections on the Institutions that
Shaped Learning for and at Work in Germany and the United States, 1800–1945.”
Ph.D. dissertation. Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997.
Hoxby, Caroline M. “All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116 (November 2001): forthcoming.
Hughes, Gordon, and Barry McCormick. “Housing Markets, Unemployment and Labour
Market Flexibility in the U.K.” European Economic Review 31 (April 1987): 615–41.
Iowa. Report of the Department of Public Instruction for [year]. Iowa School Report. Des
Moines, IA: State Printer, [year]
Keysser, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United
States. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Krug, Edward A. The Shaping of the American High School: 1880–1920. Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1964.
Lebergott, Stanley. The Americans: An Economic Record. New York: W.W. Norton, 1984.
Lee, Everett. S. “The Turner Thesis Reexamined.” American Quarterly 13 (Spring 1961):
77–83.
Lindert, Peter H. “The Comparative Political Economy of Mass Schooling before 1914.”
University of California at Davis Working Paper, 2000.
Lleras-Muney, Adriana. “Were Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws Effective?
An Analysis from 1915 to 1939.” Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, 2000.
Maddison, Angus. “Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist Economies: Techniques
of Quantitative Assessment.” 25 Journal of Economic Literature (June 1987): 649–98.
Margo, Robert A. Race and Schooling in the South, 1880–1950: An Economic History.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Massachusetts. Commission on Industrial and Technical Education. Report of the Commis-
sion on Industrial and Technical Education. Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co.,Human-Capital Century 291
State Printers, 1906.
Massachusetts. Commission on Industrial Education. Report of the Commission on Indus-
trial Education. Public document no. 76. Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., State
Printers, 1907.
McKenzie, Fred A. The American Invaders: Their Plans, Tactics, and Progress. New
York: Street & Smith, Publishers, 1902.
Mosely, Alfred. Mosely Industrial Commission: Reports of the Delegates. Manchester: Co-
operative Printing Society, 1903.
Nelson, Daniel. Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United
States, 1880–1920. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975.
Nelson, Richard, and Gavin Wright. “The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leader-
ship.” Journal of Economic Literature 30 (December 1992): 1931–64.
Noble, David F. America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate
Capitalism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
Nye, David E. Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1990.
Oleson, Alexandra, and John Voss, eds. The Organization of Knowledge in Modern Amer-
ica, 1860–1920. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Education at a
Glance, OECD Indicators: 1998. Paris: OECD, 1998.
Phelps Brown, Henry. The Inequality of Pay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Ravitch, Diane. Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2000.
Ringer, Fritz K. Education and Society in Modern Europe. Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1979.
Roman, Frederick William. The Industrial and Commercial Schools of the United States
and Germany: A Comparative Study. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915.
Rotella, Elyce. From Home to Office: U.S. Women at Work, 1870–1930. Ann Arbor, MI:
UMI Research Pres, 1981.
Ryan, Bryce, and Neal Gross. Acceptance and Diffusion of Hybrid Corn Seed in Two Iowa
Communities. Research Bulletin no. 372. Agricultural Experiment Station, Sociology
Subsection. Ames: Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts.
Sandberg, Lars G. “The Case of the Impoverished Sophisticate: Human Capital and Swed-
ish Economic Growth before World War I.” This JOURNAL 29 (March 1979): 225–41.
Sawyer, John E. “The Social Basis of the American System of Manufacturing.” This
JOURNAL 14 (Autumn 1954): 361–79.
Schultz, Theodore W. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1964.
Stanley, Marcus. “Higher Education and the Mid-Century GI Bills.” Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, February 2000.
Thomas, Alfred A. National Cash Register Factory, as Seen by English Experts of the
Mosely Industrial and Educational Commission. Dayton, OH, 1904.
U.S. Department of Education. 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait.
Washington, DC: GPO, 1993.
U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Descriptions of Occupations: Coal
and Water Gas, Paint and Varnish, Paper, Printing Trades, Rubber Goods; Electrical
Manufacturing Distribution and Maintenance; Glass; Medicinal Manufacturing. Pre-
pared for the U.S. Employment Service. Washington, DC: GPO, various years 1918–21.
United Nations. Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO). Website.
http://unescostat.unesco.org/en/stats/stats0.htm.292 Goldin
Wallace’s Farmer. Des Moines, IA, 1913.
Williams, Ernest Edwin. Made in Germany. London: W. Heinemann, 1896.